THE OFFER
AGENT AUTHORITY ASSESSMENT
A fixed-scope, fixed-price security assessment of your AI agent.
What I test
- Authority abuse — can a user trigger actions above their role (refunds, limit changes, other users’ data)?
- Prompt injection — direct and indirect (via tickets, data, tools).
- Escalation & tool-call integrity — does the agent act on unverified claims, or misreport what it did?
- Data & policy leakage — can it be made to reveal its rules or other users’ information?
What you get
- A clear report: findings, severity, proof-of-concept and concrete fixes.
- Manual expert red teaming + automated payload coverage.
- A free re-test after you patch.
How it works
Remote, under a written scope agreement. Test environment only — never your production systems.
From €3,900About two weeks from kickoff to report.
01 · THE PROBLEM
AI agents now take consequential actions.
They issue refunds, access tenant resources, invoke privileged actions and send data to external destinations.
A written rule is not proof. The action boundary must be tested on both sides and observed in state.
02 · PROOF METHOD
KIMURA PROOF METHOD
The scenario changes. The proof chain does not.
- 01Executable Action Contract
- 02Controlled Boundary Pair
- 03Actual Attempt
- 04Outcome Oracle
- 05Deterministic Verdict
- 06Exact Remediation Replay
- 07Allowed-Function Preservation
- 08Proof Capsule
03 · VERIFIED BENCHMARK V1.1 FAMILIES
ONE ENGINE. DIFFERENT ACTION BOUNDARIES.
Six currently verified families. No unsupported family is presented as current capability.
01Financial Authority
Amount, limit and approval scope
02Identity Equality
Approved actor versus substituted identity
03Tenant / Resource Ownership
Owned resource versus cross-tenant target
04Privileged Action
Approved operation versus privileged action
05Egress Destination
Approved destination versus unapproved endpoint
06Egress Data Classification
Permitted data versus restricted payload
05 · DETERMINISTIC VERDICTS
PROOF, NOT MODEL OPINION
The model’s explanation is not the source of truth.
EXPECTATIONWhat should happenExecutable policy expectation
ATTEMPTWhat the agent triedIdentity, action, arguments and target
OUTCOMEWhat actually happenedIndependent state or receipt observation
Kimura derives each canonical verdict from the declared boundary, execution evidence and observed outcome. No LLM judge decides whether the boundary held.
06 · VERIFIED CURRENT EVIDENCE
BENCHMARK V1.1
SYNTHETIC-CONTROLLED6boundary families12 / 12valid controlled pairs24 / 24verified oracle observations12 / 12canonical verdicts12 / 12benchmark Proof Capsules3 / 3remediation lifecycles3 / 3FIX_VERIFIED100%allowed-function preservation across those 3 lifecycles10 / 10fail-closed integrity tests0unexpected nondeterminism HONEST CLAUSE DENOMINATOR- 91
- compiled clauses
- 26
- supported
- 65
- unsupported
Unsupported clauses remain in the denominator instead of being silently excluded.
07 · EVIDENCE SCOPE
EVIDENCE LIMITATIONS
Current public benchmark evidence is synthetic-controlled and harness-observed.
Hash verification establishes artifact integrity and linkage. It does not independently prove the truth of an external production event.
Customer-production proof is not claimed unless customer-owned evidence is present. External customer deployments are not claimed.08 · RESEARCH PREVIEW · AGENT MUTATIONRESEARCH DIRECTION — NOT PART OF THE CURRENT PUBLIC BENCHMARK
WHEN THE AGENT CHANGES, ITS AUTHORITY SHOULD NOT SILENTLY FOLLOW.
AI agents are becoming capable of changing their code, models, tools, connectors, workflows and execution paths.
An approval or security proof established for one agent state should not automatically be assumed valid for the next.
Kimura is researching how to re-resolve what is actually running after a material change, then re-prove whether the approved action boundary still holds.
- 01
Approved stateArtifact · Identity · Policy · Credential · Target · Execution path
- 02
MutationCode · Model · Tool · Connector · Workflow
- 03
Re-resolveEstablish what is actually running now
- 04
Re-proveReplay the same allowed and forbidden boundary pair
- 05
Authority decisionMUTATION_VERIFIED or GOVERNANCE_CONTINUITY_BROKEN
Mutation may change capability. It must not silently inherit authority.
FUTURE AUTHORITY CASE
FROM REFUNDS TO AUTONOMOUS MONEY
Potential research applications:- agentic payments
- digital-asset / crypto wallet authority
- smart-account spending policies
- AI-controlled treasury operations
The question is no longer only:
“Is this action allowed?”It is:
“Does the agent performing it still deserve the authority it inherited?”
09 · DESIGN PARTNER
HAVE AN AI AGENT WITH REAL TOOLS AND ACTION POLICIES?
Kimura is looking for design partners to test boundary verification against real agent systems and customer-owned evidence sources.
- Tool-using AI agent
- Controlled test environment
- Explicit action or authorization policies
- Trusted outcome source
EXPLORE DESIGN PARTNERSHIP ↗security@cyberkimura.comFounder-led and bootstrapped.Cyber KimuraAI Agent Boundary Verification
Building AI Agent Boundary Verification for systems where agents can take consequential actions.